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ORIGINALISM, THE WHY AND THE WHAT 
Larry Alexander* 
 
This paper is short and simple—like its author.  It is short because its 
points can be made quickly, and I have elaborated on them at some length 
in many prior writings.1  It is simple because the truth about interpretation, 
that its aim is to understand what an author or authors intended to 
communicate, is a simple truth.  Indeed, as you read what follows, you will 
be trying to understand what I, in writing what follows, intend to get you to 
understand.  And in doing so, you will be confirming my simple thesis.  But 
I’m getting ahead of myself. 
1. In all tenable theories about the nature of law, there is a place for the 
following story.  We do not agree about what we ought to do, but we do 
agree that we need to settle the matter.  So we designate a person or group 
of people to decide what norm or norms should govern us with respect to 
the matters in dispute.2  That person might be a chief executive; that group 
might be a legislature or a constitutional convention.  Regardless, their job 
in all cases is to come up with norms in order to settle what is to be done in 
some domain of social life. 
2. Now, after this person or group has decided on the appropriate 
norms to govern the matter, they then must communicate to the rest of us 
what those norms are.  For their job was not merely to settle the matter 
among themselves.  It was to settle the matter for all of us.  So they are 
faced with the following task:  they must express the norms they have 
chosen in such a way that the rest of us understand what those norms are.  
 
*  Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego.  I want to thank Will 
Baude, Stanley Fish, Steve Smith, and the participants in The New Originalism in 
Constitutional Law Symposium. 
 1. See, e.g., LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, DEMYSTIFYING LEGAL REASONING 
131–232 (2008) [hereinafter ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, DEMYSTIFYING LEGAL REASONING]; 
LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES 96–122 (2001) [hereinafter 
ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES]; Larry Alexander, All or Nothing at All?  The 
Intentions of Authorities and the Authority of Intentions,” in LAW AND INTERPRETATION 
(Andrei Marmor ed., 1995); Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English You’re 
Speaking?”  Why Intention Free Interpretation Is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
967 (2004); Larry Alexander, Of Living Trees and Dead Hands, 22 CANADIAN J.L. & 
JURISPRUDENCE 227 (2009); Larry Alexander, Simple-Minded Originalism, in THE 
CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM 87, 87–98 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011); 
Larry Alexander, Telepathic Law, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 139 (2010); Larry Alexander, What 
Are Constitutions, and What Should (and Can) They Do?, 28 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 1, 15–19 
(2010). 
 2. See, e.g., SCOTT SHAPIRO, LEGALITY (2011); ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, THE RULE OF 
RULES, supra note 1, at 11–36. 
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Because we cannot ascertain the norms they have in mind through 
telepathy, they must communicate them through symbols—orally, using 
sounds; in writing, using marks; through semaphore, using flags; by smoke 
signals, and so forth. 
3. The job of the rest of us—the interpreters—is to discover what 
norms the group or person we tasked with choosing the norms actually 
chose.  In other words, in Gricean terms,3 our job is to determine the uptake 
the legislator(s) intended us to have.  Why would we choose a legislator to 
come up with norms to settle what ought to be done if, after the legislator 
does so, we do not attempt to understand what the legislator is trying to 
communicate? 
4. Here, then, is what follows from the foregoing:  The meaning of the 
norm that the legislative person or body has chosen and communicated 
symbolically is the meaning that person or body intends those symbols to 
communicate.  Whether we are talking about a constitutional provision, a 
statute, an administrative rule, an executive order, or a judicially 
promulgated rule, its meaning, for purposes of the legal enterprise, is its 
authorially intended meaning—in Gricean terms, its speaker’s meaning.4  
Any meaning it is given other than its authorially intended meaning renders 
nonsensical the idea of designating its authors as having the authority to 
determine the norms to govern us.  For the norms that they determined  just 
are the norms that they are communicating, and the symbols that they 
choose for that purpose—however aptly or inaptly—must be deemed to 
mean what they intended them to mean, in order for the norms that they 
chose to govern us to succeed in governing us.  That means we must seek 
the authorially intended meaning of the symbols, or the uptake the authors 
intended. 
5. The meaning of a legal norm is just its authorially intended meaning.  
That is the simple truth of originalism.  (I put to the side cases where the 
legal norm is a “standard” that must be given content by someone other 
than the legislator.  Interpretation, properly called, ends with the 
determination that the legislator intended the norm to be a standard.  
Originalism gets one only to that point.  Giving content to the standard is 
not interpretation, but is first-order reasoning.  The legislator did not settle 
what ought to be done, but delegated that job to other decisionmakers.) 
 
 3. Gricean refers to the principles of the linguistic philosophy of Paul Grice. See 
generally PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS (1989). 
 4. I regard speaker’s meaning as primary and Gricean utterance meaning as derivative 
and secondary.  Indeed, utterance meanings are just what most speakers intend by particular 
symbols.  They are time, place, and audience relative.  And if one’s audience knows that you 
use particular symbols nonstandardly—the audience knows you are speaking in code, or 
using an idiolect, or are “misusing” the symbols (because you believe that their standard 
meaning is something other than what it is)—than those symbols mean to the audience what 
you intended them to mean; for you have succeeded in getting the uptake you intended, 
which shows that the symbols you used were apt given your audience.  To have utterance 
meaning defeat speaker’s meaning would render lawmaking “mindless.” 
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(a) The authorially intended meaning (the Gricean speaker’s meaning)5 
is not the same thing as the authorially intended applications.  The latter are 
evidence, and often strong evidence, of the former, but the two are not the 
same thing. 
(b) The authorially intended meaning might turn on the authors’ 
reference—the thing they are referring to—rather than their criteria or 
“sense”—their definition of that thing.  Such might be the case where their 
norms refer to “poisons” or to “death.”  On the other hand, the authorially 
intended meanings of some norms might elevate sense over reference—as, 
for example, if a premodern statute forbade taking “fish” from a bay, and 
the legislators thought of whales as fish.6 
(c) Authorially intended meaning is not the “original public meaning” 
(OPM), whatever the latter is.  OPM either reduces to authorially intended 
meaning or, if at odds with it, undermines the legal enterprise.  OPM is 
supposed to be the meaning that would be inferred by a hypothetical 
reasonable person existing contemporaneously with the promulgation of the 
norm.  For OPM proponents, that hypothetical person’s uptake is the 
meaning of the norm.  However, that hypothetical person cannot be 
nonarbitrarily constructed:  Is the person a he or a she?  Does he or she live 
in the city or the country?  How much education and of which kind has he 
or she had?  How much information does he or she possess about the law in 
question and the reasons behind its promulgation, etc.?  Moreover, even if 
that hypothetical person could be nonarbitrarily constructed, the meaning 
that person should be seeking is the authorially intended meaning.  (That 
follows from the points made earlier.)  Presumably, then, advocates of 
OPM are positing a failure to discover the authorially intended meaning and 
the substitution of a different norm from the norm that the legislators chose 
to enact.  But why have legislators if we are going to ignore their enacted 
norms and substitute instead norms that a hypothetical person would have 
mistakenly thought the legislators enacted? 
(d) The motivations behind OPM seem to be two.7  One is a sense that it 
is somehow unfair to declare that the enacted norm is different from what a 
reasonable person at the time of enactment would have thought it to be.8  
But that concern is confused.  If we discover today that a norm has a 
different meaning from what people in the past took it to mean, there is no 
unfairness in correcting course and going with the new meaning.  No one is 
going to be punished for a reasonable misunderstanding by a hypothetical 
person.  Nor does it follow that flesh and blood people will be punished for 
 
 5. See GRICE, supra note 3, at 117–37. 
 6. See, e.g., ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, DEMYSTIFYING LEGAL REASONING, supra note 1, 
at 148–49. 
 7. I have heard a third motivation voiced, namely, a concern that the authors might 
have a secret intended meaning that they wish to conceal from their audience.  That concern 
rests upon a confusion, however.  The authorially intended meaning just is the audience 
uptake that the authors intend.  A secret authorially intended meaning is an impossibility. 
 8. In the case of the Constitution, if the reasonable person at the time of enactment is a 
ratifier, then his or her understanding is germane.  But that is because he or she is really the 
author of the Constitution. 
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or prejudiced by reasonable misunderstandings.  (We have doctrines to deal 
with reasonable misinterpretations.)  Although it is probably a rare event 
when a later interpreter has better evidence of the authorially intended 
meaning than the legislator’s contemporaries, it can and probably does 
happen.  And there is nothing unfair about declaring the interpretations of 
reasonable contemporaries to have been mistaken. 
(e) The other principal motivation behind OPM is to avoid the problem 
of attributing a single authorially intended meaning to a law that is the 
product of a multimember body.  Unlike the fairness “problem,” collective 
authorship is a problem for authorially intended meaning.  On occasion, 
there will be little or no shared meaning behind a shared set of symbols.  A 
simple example can stand in for all the cases.  Suppose there are three 
legislators, and they enact laws by majority vote.  The text of the law they 
vote on reads, “There shall be no meetings by the bank.”  Legislator A 
votes “aye” and believes that “bank” refers to the river bank.  He is in favor 
because he thinks meetings there are hazardous due to frequent flooding.  
Legislator B votes “aye” and believes “bank” refers to the town’s financial 
institution.  She is in favor because meetings there interfere with the bank’s 
customers’ comings and goings.  And let us suppose, for whatever reasons, 
legislator A would have voted “no” had he believed “bank” referred to the 
financial institution, and legislator B would have voted “no” had she 
believed “bank” referred to the river bank.  Legislator C, a libertarian, votes 
“no” and would vote “no” on either meaning of “bank.”  The law passes 
two to one.  What does it forbid? 
I would say that despite the appearance of being meaningful, the law has 
no authorially intended meaning.  It is gibberish.9  Each of the legislators 
has an authorially intended meaning; but because the law requires at least 
two authors, the law itself has no authorially intended meaning.10 
But here’s the point.  OPM cannot help here.  For suppose the 
hypothetical reasonable person knows all the facts.  He or she is going to 
come to the same conclusion as I just did, namely, that the so-called law is 
gibberish. 
6. To say that the meaning of a law is its authorially intended meaning 
is not to say that discovering that meaning will be an easy matter.  
Sometimes it will be, but sometimes it won’t.  Indeed, sometimes it will be 
difficult for the author herself to determine her intended meaning.  That 
difficulty will typically arise in cases where what appears to be the 
originally intended meaning of a law has an unforeseen application that is at 
odds with the purpose behind the law.  If the author of the law is asked what 
meaning she intended with respect to such a case, she might respond in one 
of four ways: 
 
 9. See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, DEMYSTIFYING LEGAL REASONING, supra note 1, at 
171–73. 
 10. Richard Ekins has argued that legislatures and their procedures can be structured in 
ways that prevent such failures of authorially intended meaning. See generally RICHARD 
EKINS, THE NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT (2012).  That may be true, but not all legislative 
bodies are so structured. 
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(a) I intended the law to cover such a case, even though I didn’t foresee 
it, because I intended the law to be a bright-line rule, and I realized it would 
be overinclusive to some extent.  Indeed, because I intended the law to be a 
bright-line rule, I would not have amended it even if I had foreseen this 
application. 
(b) I intended the law to cover this kind of case because I did not foresee 
the perniciousness of this application.  But now that I see that this 
application is pernicious, I regret having intended the law to cover it.  
Nonetheless, although I now regret it, my intended meaning does cover it. 
(c) The application of the law in this case is so pernicious or absurd that 
I surely did not intend its meaning to cover this case.  (Consider the 
hypothetical of the boss who orders a subordinate “to remove all the 
ashtrays” because an important client is coming who abhors smoking.  The 
boss is unaware that there are some ashtrays built into the walls.  The 
subordinate duly rips those out, leaving gaping holes.11  The boss might 
truthfully say, “I didn’t intend that” by my instruction.) 
(d) Finally, there will possibly be some cases where the author cannot 
say what she intended with respect to the unforeseen application. 
7. The last point raises one of the great philosophical mysteries about 
following authorial intent, whether by the interpreter or by the author 
herself.  That is the so-called Kripkenstein problem.  How can we infer 
from the finite content of the author’s mind at the time of the utterance the 
norm that will make it true that something is the intended meaning in an 
indefinite number of future applications?12  I offer no solution to this much-
debated philosophical puzzle.  But I am confident that although I cannot 
explain them, there are truths about intended meanings that cover an 
indefinite number of applications not present in the mind of the author at 
the time of the utterance. 
*  *  * 
Authorially intended meanings are what originalism is properly seeking.  
And that quest is properly the job of anyone who must interpret the 
promulgations of legal authorities.  To ignore their authorially intended 
meanings is to undermine the enterprise that the authorities are engaged in, 
which is to settle for us the norms that should guide us.  For that reason, 
originalism of the authorially intended meanings variety is really the only 
game in town.13 
 
 11. Kent Greenawalt gives a similar hypothetical in which a manager tells a subordinate 
to shut the manager’s door and the subordinate does so in the face of the company’s 
president, who was on his way to see the manager. KENT GREENAWALT, LAW AND 
OBJECTIVITY 13–16 (1992); see also ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, DEMYSTIFYING LEGAL 
REASONING, supra note 1, at 141–45 (giving other similar examples). 
 12. See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, DEMYSTIFYING LEGAL REASONING, supra note 1, at 
160–65. 
 13. Of course, we can ignore the authorially intended meanings if we don’t like them, in 
which case we have become the authors of the legal norms, not those whose symbols we 
might appropriate to convey our meanings.  That describes a revolution, a change of the rule 
544 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
 
of recognition, albeit a peaceful one.  See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Rules of 
Recognition, Constitutional Controversies, and the Dizzying Dependence of Law on 
Acceptance, in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 175 (Matthew D. 
Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma eds., 2009). 
